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Abstract 
 
 
Land improvements with long pay-back periods are often delayed on leased agricultural land, 
resulting in social costs through land degradation, decreased land productivity and environmental 
problems. An important question is thus how landowners would respond to regulations and 
mandates concerning land improvements. Based on a landowner survey, we analyse landowner 
choices under certain land improvement regulations, using the currently dominant choice of 
leasing land for agricultural use as the benchmark. The results indicated that land leasing will 
continue to increase in the future, but if the landowner mandate to co-finance costly land 
improvements is increased, landowners are predicted to respond significantly to these mandates 
and search for other land management options. Three heterogeneous landowner groups were 
identified based on their land use choices. Current leasers and amenity owners, in particular, were 
sensitive to land improvement mandates, and would avoid compulsory investment expenses by 
selling or afforesting their land.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In most Western countries, technological change in agriculture has reduced the number of 
farms and increased farm size. At the same time, structural development in the ownership of arable 
land has only been moderate or has fragmented land ownership even further, as former farmers and 
their heirs have maintained capital in land while moving to off-farm occupations (Ryan et al., 
2001). Some landowners who are no longer active farmers have left their agricultural land idle or 
afforested it, while others have kept their land in agricultural use through leasing to neighbouring 
active farmers. In many Western countries, the land area cultivated under lease contracts has 
gradually increased and already comprises a substantial share of the total arable land area (Ciaian 
et al., 2010). In Finland, land leasing has increased rapidly since the 1980s, and the share of land 
cultivated under lease contacts is currently 33% of total arable land area (Myyrä et al., 2008).  
Under fixed-term cash lease contracts, which are common in many European countries, the 
tenant’s incentives to carry out long-term land improvements are weakened by the insecurity of 
land tenure (Soule et al., 2000; Holden and Hailu, 2002; Fraser, 2004; Myyrä et al., 2005). Current 
land rental markets may be informational inefficient, as information on land quality may not be 
available to the tenant or some of the quality characteristics may not really contribute to the lease 
price. This lack of information hinders full internalization of the economic surplus generated by 
land improvements to the agents who pay the sunk cost of these improvements. These market 
failures and problems in rent sharing are important, because they have been found to reduce land 
improvement and have had significant effects not only on agricultural productivity, but more 
generally on the protection of the environment, particularly water quality, and the recreational 
value of rural assets. 
A commonly implemented policy option is to impose mandates or obligations for land 
improvements in order for a farmer to be eligible for public agricultural support programmes. 
Obligatory responsibilities are used, at least in the current agricultural policy of the EU. The 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) requires farmers to respect cross compliance standards in two 
ways. First, all farmers claiming direct payments must follow the standards of good agricultural 
and environmental practices, avoiding the abandonment of agricultural land and its environmental 
consequences. Second, they must respect statutory management requirements relating to the 
protection of the environment, as well as public, animal and plant health, and animal welfare (EC 
2003). Under the Finnish production environment, for example, investments in irreversible land 
improvements, such as drainage systems, are often necessary to protect the environment, for instance 
by reducing nutrient leakages.  
Thus, it is evident that certain noteworthy mandates and obligations have already been imposed 
in the current CAP through cross compliance and environmental regulations, but at least in the 
Finnish case, it is the tenant who as an active farmer is responsible for fulfilling these obligations, 
not the landowner. However, as the current practice does not produce satisfactory results, these 
obligations could also be imposed on the landowner to increase the benefits of environmental 
programmes and target the sustainable long-term development of farmland ownership. This issue 
is also relevant from the income distribution perspective, because it is argued that landowners, not 
tenants, have gained the greatest benefits from the CAP, because the supports have capitalized in 
short-term land rents (Ciaian et al., 2010). The issue of targeting such obligations at landowners 
rather than their tenants has institutional counterparts in Finland in legislation mandating the 
owners of forests and real estates to implement fundamental improvements.  
Recently, it has also been more broadly recognized that land property rights have been shifting 
from the wide concept of ownership and unrestricted use of natural resources to ownership 
including duties of stewardship (Rodgers, 2009). Nevertheless, the existing empirical literature has 
shown little interest in the effects of compulsory conservation regimes or policies obligating land 
improvements, and the reactions of landowners to these considerable regulations have remained 
unknown. Policies that enforce land improvements can also encourage landowners to select other 
land use alternatives, either to avoid the anticipated costs from the obligations or to better subtract 
the resulting surpluses, rather than committing them to meeting the land improvement obligations 
and trying to share their costs or to cashing in on their long-term benefits through lease 
arrangements. Thus, obligations for land improvement could encourage land sales or afforestation. 
It has been suggested that there may also be heterogeneity in landowner reactions to a policy of 
land improvement obligations, i.e. some owners may be more inclined to continue as landlords and 
invest in their land, while others may search for alternative options (Pouta et al., 2010). 
The objectives and approach of this study are first to analyse the characteristics of our 
benchmark choice of land leasing. We estimate the agricultural land leasing behaviour and future 
leasing intentions of current landowners based on a survey of Finnish farmland owners. A policy 
to obligate the landowners to make land improvements is evaluated as a potential policy 
instrument to prevent land degradation. To analyse the effect of such a land improvement 
obligation (LIO), we use a contingent behaviour method that focuses on the choices of landowners 
between either leasing land or other land use alternatives, conditional on the obligations for land 
improvements with different monetary expenses. Finally, we analyse the heterogeneity of land use 
choices between different types of landowners and their reactions to an improvement obligation.  
 
METHODS 
 
Sampling and survey method 
The sample of landowners for this study, including both active farmers and passive 
landowners, was selected from the register of the Finnish tax administration based on the 2004 
situation. The register included information on approximately 500 000 individual farmland owners. 
To define the criteria for sampling, the field area distribution and regional distribution of 
ownership in the population were analysed. This information was used to partition sampling 
clusters to guarantee a representative sample of both active and passive landowners and various 
farm sizes in all regions of the country.  
A mail survey was used to acquire data on landowners’ sale preferences. A questionnaire was 
mailed to a sample of 5 762 land owners.5 To ensure a sufficient response rate, we used a 
modification of Dillman’s total design method (Dillman, 1978) including several contacts with the 
respondent, i.e. a reminder postcard and re-mailing of the questionnaire. Focus groups and a pilot 
survey were used to develop the questionnaire. Consideration of the annual duties of the farmers in 
choosing the mailing time (late autumn in 2006) was important to achieve a high response rate.   
The mail survey yielded a total of 2 684 observations from the sample of landowners. This 
represented 47% of the total number of mailed questionnaires. The data represented the population 
of farmland owners quite well, although older male owners with large properties were slightly 
over-represented. 
The questionnaire and contingent behaviour  
The questionnaire focused on a single real estate owned by the responding landowner. In the 
questionnaire the current land use choices were measured by asking whether the use of agricultural 
land during the previous summer (2006) included farming, managing without farming, leasing, 
setting aside and/or afforesting. Respondents selected either “yes” or “no” for each alternative. A 
question on future land use intentions assessed in a similar way whether the respondent intended to 
farm, manage without farming, lease out, sell, set aside and/or afforest all or part of the agricultural 
land on the estate in the next five years (yes/no). The pilot study allowing a distribution of land 
allocations in percentages revealed that the total field area was typically allocated to only one land 
use option. If two alternatives were chosen, the allocation was typically 50% / 50%. This 
supported the use of a dichotomous scale for each land use choice in the final questionnaire. 
To examine the effects of a land improvement obligation we used the contingent behaviour 
method, which has typically been applied in recreation economics for the purposes of resource 
valuation (Engling and Cameron, 1996; Grijalva et al., 2002). However, in our case we were not 
interested in the value of alternative land use options or the policy benefits but the behavioural 
response to a conjectured regulation. In a contingent behaviour survey, respondents are presented 
with a hypothetical situation in which either the price or the quality of a good is altered, and their 
behavioural reaction to such a change is assessed. In our case, the policy option of a land 
improvement obligation was introduced to the respondents. The land improvement obligation was 
reported to concern basic land improvements such as liming and drainage. The improvement 
obligation would cause a sunk cost every five years and, averaged over the years, the cost of the 
required improvements would be either 60, 90, 120 or 150 euros/hectare/year. The improvement 
obligation would cover not only leased land, but also land cultivated by the owner him/herself as 
well as land managed without farming. After presenting this information, the landowners were 
asked about their land use choices under the agricultural land improvement obligation. Again, all 
the land use alternatives were provided and the landowners responded “yes” or “no” to each 
alternative, implying that they would allocate either part or whole of the field area to that 
alternative.  
The socio-demographic and household characteristics of the landowners were measured with 
typical background questions and the economic data were completed with register information on 
agricultural taxation and income taxation, including variables such as income from agriculture, off-
farm capital income, and off-farm labour income. Farm-related information comprised measures 
such as the importance of forestry, the spatial coherence of the fields and the existence of 
production buildings and machinery. In addition to these, we measured landowner perceptions of 
the local land markets in terms of perceptions of the number of possible buyers and renters. 
The objectives for land ownership were assessed using 28 separate items with a five-point 
response scale. These items were used in latent class analysis to form landowner groups. As a 
result of this latent class analysis based on land ownership objective statements, five owner groups 
were formed (reported in detail in Pouta et al., 2010). The first group comprised agricultural 
earners, who emphasized objectives that were associated with income, but also with economic 
security. For multiobjective owners, almost all objectives were considered important, including 
agricultural income, economic security as well as objectives linked to the environment and 
traditions. Family-oriented owners emphasized objectives related to leisure and traditions. 
Dispassionate amenity owners valued objectives related to traditions, recreation and nature, but 
these objectives were not perceived very strongly among these landowners. None of the objectives 
were important for indifferent owners.   
Descriptive statistics of land leasing  
The land use choices are presented in Table 1. The first column describes land use choices in 
the survey year, while the second column gives the land use intentions in 2011, and the third one 
the land use intentions under a land improvement obligation (LIO) policy in 2011. From 1 200 to 
1 700 respondents answered various dichotomous questions concerning land use alternatives. As 
several land use alternatives could be chosen at the same time, the cumulative share of participants 
could overlap and was not restricted below an upper bound of 100%. Leasing out land was the 
most frequently selected land use alternative under both time frames and also under the LIO 
policy. However, under the LIO policy, the share of intending leasers was 13 percentage points 
lower than without the policy. Indeed, under the LIO policy, the share of landowners was lower 
than without the policy for all land use alternatives except land selling, for which it was 14 
percentage points higher under the LIO policy.    
Table 1. The current (2006) choice of land use alternatives, together with the future (2011) intention 
and intention (2011) under a land improvement obligation (LIO) policy. 
 Current Future 
Future 
under LIO 
Land use alternative chosen alternative, % share 
Leasing out 56.1 61.2 48.2 
Farming 55.1 50.7 47.1 
Management without farming  33.8 43.2 42.1 
Selling * 14.9 28.4 
Setting aside 19.6 25.4 21.2 
Afforestation 10.3 47.1 36.5 
Total 174.9 242.5 223.5 
*not measured, as the focus was on currently owned agricultural land 
Econometric approach 
In the statistical models, the decision to lease was defined as the benchmark. It was modelled 
first as a separate choice and independent of other land use options. Second, all six land use 
options were constructed in the choice set and the choice between all land use alternatives was 
modelled. 
First, three logit models were estimated to explain with co-variants the current leasing choice 
and future leasing intentions with and without a policy imposing mandatory land improvements.  
Second, to analyse the effect of time and policy on the leasing decision, we focused on the 
leasing choice as a sequence of the three binary dependent variables, the decision to either lease or 
not to lease land (1,0). These choices provided a three-row data set for each respondent, similar to 
panel data. Independent variables, in addition to farm and owner characteristics, were the TIME 
variable, t, to describe whether the leasing decision was current or future, and the LIO variable if 
the policy p was implemented, implying a cost to the landowner. In this way, the policy variable 
was zero in the selection of the present land use and for the future intention without an LIO policy. 
When the responses from the contingent behaviour question were examined, the policy variable 
obtained positive bid values. A panel logit model was used.  
The land leasing decision j is only one option from the total choice set of land use alternatives 
n. In the next step we were interested in the alternative land uses as compared to the benchmark of 
leasing out the land. First, we used a conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) to model the 
choice between the land use alternatives given the land use attributes and the cost of the land 
improvement obligation. Second, to allow heterogeneity among respondents, we applied a latent 
class model (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). Behind the observed variables, a number of 
unobserved variables may exist that could indicate separate subpopulations, each having their own 
distribution of observed variables. In our application, there might be subpopulations of landowners 
with their own distributions in relation to land use choices. To take this heterogeneity into an 
account and improve the explanatory power of the conditional logit models, latent owner groups 
were investigated with a latent class model. The basic idea in a latent class model for binary choice 
data is that the parameters of a regression model differ across estimated classes (Wedel and 
DeSarbo, 1994). In modelling the choice between all land uses, the data were rearranged so that 
those respondents who selected only one land use alternative were coded into six rows in the new 
data set, each row representing one alternative. Those owners who selected more than one 
alternative were given a number of rows that was equal to the selected alternative times six 
possible alternatives. Their rows in the data were weighted with a factor (1/selected alternatives) to 
give each respondent an equal weight in the data. From the several models with alternative class 
sizes, the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) were used to define the number of classes. 
In the specification of each model we attempted to include relevant variables from the 
categories defined in the previous literature, i.e. policy variables, in this case the cost for the 
landowner, farm characteristics, landowner and household socio-demographic attributes and 
landowner objectives. Several farm-level economic variables such as the market return or subsidies 
were only positive for the active farmers and were omitted due the large number of zeros that 
correlated with the landowner objective classes.  
 
 
 
 RESULTS 
 
The single land leasing choices over other land use alternatives were first estimated with three 
separate logit models (Table 2). The first model was specified for the current behaviour, the second 
for future intentions with the current policy, and the third for future intentions with a management 
obligation policy. The first model for the current choice of leasing classified 57% of owners as 
leasers. The model revealed several farm and owner-related characteristics that significantly 
predicted the leasing choice. A larger field area reduced the probability of leasing, and leasing was 
more likely in agriculture-oriented southern and western Finland than in northern and eastern areas 
of the country, where leasing markets are very limited. The farms with a higher probability of 
leasing represented a lower level of capital in production buildings and machinery. According to 
the model, elderly landowners living outside the farm compound were more likely to lease out 
their land than other owners. From the land ownership objective classes, family-oriented owners 
and dispassionate amenity owners, in particular, decided to lease out more often than owners in 
other objective classes.  
Table 2. Land leasing choices. 
 
Current leasers Future leasers Future leasers 
under LIO 
All choices in 
panel 
 
b p-value b p-
value 
b p-
value 
b p-
value 
Intercept -0.308 0.341 
-
1.230 0.000 -1.262 0.000 -1.028 0.000 
Time       0.310 0.004 
LIO cost     0.001 0.766 -0.005 0.000 
Field area  -0.016 0.002 
-
0.036 0.000 -0.024 0.000 -0.028 0.000 
Eastern Finland -0.495 0.001   -0.285 0.051 -0.232 0.032 
Northern Finland -0.842 0.000     -0.419 0.002 
Production buildings and machinery -0.317 0.000     -0.193 0.000 
Owner’s age 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.029 0.000 
Lives on the farm -0.267 0.067     -0.276 0.012 
Owner’s perception of rental market   0.320 0.002   0.148 0.019 
Objectives: Agricultural earners (ref.)  0.000  0.048  0.002  0.000 
Multiobjective owners 0.267 0.222 0.291 0.169 0.311 0.147 0.511  
Family-oriented owners 0.908 0.000 0.583 0.005 0.584 0.004 0.969  
Dispassionate amenity owners 0.664 0.000 0.469 0.013 0.168 0.365 0.625  
Indifferent owners -0.152 0.561 0.249 0.373 -0.389 0.150 0.316  
N  1233  1121  1076  848  
Lease based on data, % 51%  62%  44%  53%  
Lease based on model, % 57%  80%  38%  60%  
Correctly classified 69%  70%  61%  70%  
Log-likelihood (model) -725  -670  -700  -1472  
Chi-squared 256  158  103  11790  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Nagelkerke-R
2 
 0.24  0.18  0.12  0.21  
 
In the second model, the average probability for a future intention to lease agricultural land 
was estimated at 80%, which was 23 percentage points greater than the estimated current leasing 
probability. In relative terms, the result suggests that land leasing will increase by more than a 
third (40%) in the near future. However, the leasing choice was not as easily explained with 
background variables, as only a few of the previous variables, such as the owner’s age, objectives 
and the field area, were significant. Concerning future intentions, market access was more of a 
concern, as the owner’s perceptions of rental markets, i.e. the number of potential renters, 
significantly increased the intention to lease.  
The variable of special interest in the third model predicting the intention to lease under an LIO 
policy was the cost of the LIO to the landowner. The cost variable was not, as such, significant in 
explaining the leasing intentions. This was partly explained by the fact that in the data under the 
LIO policy used for this model, all respondents faced a positive cost due to the LIO policy and no 
zero cost was included. However, based on the model, the introduction of the LIO policy reduced 
the average probability for an intention to lease agricultural land to as little as 38%. 
To further explore the effects of the time horizon and the LIO costs from the zero level to 
positive expenses, as well as the time horizon of the land use decision, we estimated a model for 
the sequence of three possibly interrelated leasing choices in the panel data. The model controlling 
for all three choices confirmed the significantly increasing interest in land leasing, as the time 
variable obtained a positive coefficient. In this specification, the LIO cost variable also 
significantly reduced the probability of leasing out agricultural land. The other explanatory 
variables followed the lines of the three previous models.  
The model for panel data was further used to predict the effect of the LIO cost on the 
proportion of land leasers and on the share of leased agricultural land (Figure 1). As there was a 
strong tendency towards increasing lease intentions in the future, it is interesting to define the level 
of LIO costs that would balance the growth in leasing. The level that would balance the growth to 
the current level of 51% (in the data) of landowners was determined to be 120 euros per hectare 
per year. This figure also illustrates the strong distinction between the proportion of leasing owners 
and the share of leased agricultural land area due to the negative effect of the land area owned on 
the probability of leasing. The difference in behaviour between owners of various size holdings 
was considerable, as illustrated in the second part of Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Cost of the land improvement obligation (LIO) and the probability of leasing in the 
future.  
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 Table 3. Choice between land use alternatives. 
 
Conditiona
l logit 
Latent class model 
 
b p Farmer
s  
Land-
lords 
Amenit
y 
owners 
Wald 
overall 
p-
value 
Wald 
equalit
y 
p-value 
   Class1 Class2 Class3   
Class size, %   37% 35% 28%   
LIO cost 
-0.005 0.00
0 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
0.000 
- 
Land use label 
 0.00
0      
leasing out 0.000     0.000 0.000 
farming -0.501  1.573 -5.809 -0.849   
management without farming  -0.773  0.686 -2.988 -0.262   
selling -1.803  -1.474 -1.593 -2.248   
setting aside -2.310  -7.750 -3.881 -1.408   
afforestation -1.582  -2.004 -2.669 -0.696   
Model for classes        
Intercept    -3.124 -0.284 0.002  
Field area     -0.022 -0.052 0.087  
Southern Finland    0 0 0.012  
    Eastern Finland    -0.158 0.128   
    Western Finland    0.289 -0.139   
    Northern Finland    -0.783 1.107   
Share of revenue from forestry    0.015 0.023 0.013  
Production buildings and 
machinery 
  
 -0.399 -0.335 0.006  
Owner’s age    0.098 0.073 0.000  
Lives on the farm    -1.066 -1.192 0.043  
Owner’s perception of rental 
market 
  
 -0.388 -1.623 0.000  
Objective: Agricultural earners    0 0 0.001  
Multiobjective owners    0.328 0.638   
Family-oriented owners    1.359 2.149   
Dispassionate amenity owners    2.151 1.893   
Indifferent owners    8.483 7.393   
N 1188  736     
Correctly classified, % 37%  52%     
R² 0.08  0.27     
 
As the choice to lease agricultural land is followed in a landowner’s decision making by the 
choice of an alternative land use, we reformulated the dependent variable to indicate the choice 
between various land use alternatives. The conditional logit and the latent class models for the 
choice between land use alternatives are presented in Table 3. In the conditional logit model, we 
used two attributes of land use as explanatory variables for choice, i.e. the constant for each land 
use alternative and the LIO cost associated with each land use. The results revealed the likelihood 
order of the choice for various land use alternatives compared to leasing by the landowner, which 
was the reference level in the model. Leasing out land was the most preferred land use alternative. 
All the other land use forms were less frequently chosen. The uses that were particularly seldom 
chosen were setting aside and selling the land. The model confirmed that respondents were 
significantly less likely to select a land use if it involved LIO costs.  
The latent class model (Table 3) for the land use choices provided a picture of the 
heterogeneity of landowners in their land use choices. After running several models with an 
increasing number of classes and using the BIC information criteria in ranking the specifications, 
we ended up with a three-class model. Two out of the three classes could be easily interpreted 
from the leasing behaviour and background variables. The farmers formed over third (37%) of the 
sample and the landlords one third (35%). The third group, representing 28% of the full sample, 
was named as amenity owners based on their landowner profile.   
The LIO cost had a significant negative effect on the probability of choosing a related land use 
alternative in all groups, but there were no significant differences in the effect of the LIO between 
groups. In the model with three classes, leasing out land was preferred to all other land use options 
by the landlords and amenity owners. Compared with farming, landlords also considered all other 
land use alternatives, particularly selling, as positive. For farmers, all the other land use options 
were less preferred than farming, as expected. The amenity owners preferred management without 
farming as well as afforestation almost as much as leasing. They considered selling to be the least 
preferred alternative.  
The covariates of this latent class model revealed the socioeconomic profile for the three 
landowner groups. In the lower part of Table 3, the groups are further described with farm and 
landowner variables, having farmers as a reference group. In the group of landlords, when 
compared to farmers, the farm profiles were quite apparent: a smaller field area, lower level of 
previous investments in production buildings and machinery and a higher share of income from 
forestry. Landowner profiles also provided a natural description of the difference between farmers 
and landlords, as landlords were older and more often lived outside the farm. Compared to 
farmers’ objectives, the landlords more often belonged to owner groups emphasising objectives 
other than agricultural earnings.  
Of particular interesting was the profile of the amenity owners. Their estates were even less 
production-oriented than the estates of landlords. These estates were located in northern and 
eastern Finland, which are regions of less intensive farming. The field areas were small and there 
were fewer production buildings and less machinery on the forestry-oriented estates. Owners’ 
perceptions of the number of potential renters were lower than in other owner classes. Family- and 
amenity-oriented objectives were emphasised in this class.  
The latent landowner classes in Table 3 were used to predict the land use choices in each group 
of landowners. In the group of landlords, the LIO cost shifted choices from leasing to selling, 
setting aside and afforestation. Similar, but smaller changes were also observed in the group of 
amenity owners, where the LIO cost particularly increased the share of owners choosing 
afforestation. In the group of farmers, the response to the LIO costs was negligible.     
 
 CONCUSIONS 
 
Our results on landowner intentions suggest that land tenancy is likely to increase considerably 
in Finland in the near future, unless targeted policies are designed to reverse the prevailing 
development patterns. The structural separation between land ownership and farming will continue 
in the future as the current farmers age, retire and are inclined to lease rather than sell their land. 
Based on the characteristics associated with leasing, the estimates consistently indicate that leasing 
is a preferred alternative for many landowners who do not live on the farm, do not have adequate 
production machinery or buildings, or are ageing but do not have a successor for the farm in the 
family. Although the probability of leasing is generally increasing over time, the development also 
exhibits large spatial differences. The data indicate that leasing is no longer an alternative in the 
most remote and sparsely populated rural areas, where agriculture has declined to the extent that 
the markets for leasing are weak.  
The results suggest that landowners respond to regulations that increase their costs, even if 
these costs relate to land improvements that are expected to increase productivity, environmental 
sustainability and the value of their agricultural land. Landowner responses are, nevertheless, 
heterogeneous, and heterogeneity among landowners is characterized by three different groups 
with respect to their land use choices and their reactions to land improvement obligations. In 
addition to the very obvious group of farmers, the groups of landlords and amenity owners had 
significantly different preference structures for the use of agricultural land. The main interpretation 
of these two groups is that they operate in spatially different circumstances, as for the landlords in 
western Finland the rental markets have offered opportunities for leasing out, but in eastern and 
northern parts of the country forestry provides opportunities for amenity ownership beyond 
agriculture. The existence of these groups indicates that policies promoting land improvements can 
lead to different land use choices individually and spatially.  
The land improvement obligation (LIO) would be a policy that has a very different target group 
compared to the current Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Europe. It would attempt to keep 
otherwise passive landowners involved in the productivity enhancing management of their land. 
Based on our results, we can conclude that for many landowners, such drastic regulation would, 
nevertheless, not only directly promote land improvements, but would also have broader 
implications for land use. The LIO would encourage landowners to search for land use options, 
such as land sales and afforestation to avoid LIO costs. Afforestation is considered as an attractive 
option to avoid these costs, particularly amongst amenity owners.  
The preference for avoiding the LIO cost was estimated to be strongest amongst those 
landowners who do not cultivate their land by themselves and, thus, cannot directly collect the 
benefits that the land improvements would generate. This result is consistent with earlier findings 
concerning market inefficiency in land leasing between the landlord and the tenant (Myyrä and 
Pouta, 2010). It suggests that landowners who have leased their land may face higher than average 
uncertainty over subtracting the future economic surpluses generated by the obligations they would 
be regulated to pay.  
We conclude that such a strong regulatory approach as the LIO policy would be consistent with 
resolving land tenure insecurity problems and enhancing land productivity, but its efficiency 
deserves at least a question mark. The obligation for improvements would partly reduce land 
tenure insecurity through activating land sales, but it would also encourage some landowners to 
switch their land use more broadly, so that more land would be allocated to non-agricultural 
purposes.  
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